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Public services and GATS
GATS does not apply to services supplied under governmen-
tal authority. The term governmental authority is further defi-
ned in Article I:3 (c) GATS as services which are supplied “neit-
her on a commercial basis nor in competition with one or more
service suppliers”. The meaning of this definition is open to furt-
her interpretation and has been the cause of some irritation both
inside and outside the WTO. This stems from the potentially
wide scope of the notions “commercial basis” and “in competi-
tion”. It is generally agreed that a service supplied “on a com-
mercial basis” can be defined as a service supplied on a profit-
seeking basis. Services are supplied “in competition” if two or
more service suppliers target the same market with the same or
substitutable services. As a consequence, only services which
are supplied on a non-profit basis by a public monopoly supplier
are excluded from the scope of GATS.
This shows that the scope of GATS does not exclude particu-
lar services because of their nature as a service of general inte-
rest, or because of their characteristics as a governmental ser-
vice under national law, or because they are supplied by a public
authority. Rather, non-competitiveness and non-commerciality
determine whether a service sector is covered by GATS. In ot-
her words, a WTO member wishing to exclude a particular ser-
vice from the scope of GATS must ensure that this service is
supplied on a non-profit and non-competitive basis. For exam-
ple, if drinking water is distributed by a government department
or a state-owned company on a monopoly basis and at a very low
subsidised price, which prevents the distributor from making a
profit, it can be argued that drinking water distribution is a ser-
vice which would fall outside of the scope of GATS.
Many environmental services today are not supplied exclusi-
vely by a government or a public entity. Many are supplied on a
profit-seeking basis, especially when they are provided through
hybrid financing forms such as public-private partnerships or
private financial initiatives, as these forms of financing public
services involve profit seeking on the part of the private partner.
It is therefore safe to assume that most environmental services
are covered by GATS.
Areas of potential conflict
The GATS does not prevent WTO Members from establis-
hing and maintaining special regimes for the provision of envi-
ronmental services. It neither requires nor precludes a particu-
lar regulatory framework. However, GATS disciplines influence
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), whichentered into force as one of the agreements administered by
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, is a key element
of the international framework on trade in services. It has a pro-
found impact on trade in environmental services and on the re-
gulation of such services aimed to ensure high-quality, efficient
and accessible environmental services. This contribution addres-
ses the scope of potential conflict between WTO rules and re-
gulation of environmental services, but it will also highlight the
flexibility of GATS and how GATS can be used to reinfore regu-
latory policies (1).
Domestic regulation of environmental 
services
The provision of environmental services often constitutes a
natural monopoly, in particular if large infrastructure networks
are required. Typically, the supply of water or the collection of
sewage are considered natural monopolies. Without government
interference, the provision of such a service through an unre-
gulated market would either result in inefficient duplication of
networks or exploitation of consumers. 
Furthermore, many environmental services have characte-
ristics of a public good. A public good is not usually provided by
private economic agents without governmental assistance, be-
cause the non-exclusive and non-rival character of a public good
does not promise adequate returns. The general health and sa-
fety benefits of refuse collection in public places are a typical
example for such positive external effects. Hence, refuse collec-
tion in public places is considered a public function. For these
reasons, strict regulatory control through exclusive contracts,
economic needs tests, technical standards and licensing requi-
rements is still a key feature in many environmental services re-
gimes.
Die Marktentwicklung von Umwelt-Dienstleis-
tungen ist in hohem Maße politikabhängig. Da-
bei spielen neben internationalen Abkommen
wie GATS auch vielfältige nationale Regelungen
ein Rolle. Doch wie können verschiedene In-
strumente aufeinander ausgerichtet werden,
um positive Entwicklungen zu unterstützen?
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the adoption and implementation of specific regulatory instru-
ments. Furthermore, current GATS disciplines as well as futu-
re liberalisation commitments create a political momentum to-
wards liberalisation.
Therefore, a regulatory regime which relies on government
intervention in the market and restrictions on economic activi-
ties may be subject to greater constraints under GATS than a
system relying on competition and market forces. In this res-
pect, the traditional provision of environmental infrastructure
services such as the supply of drinking water to households, the
collection of waste water or the collection and disposal of refu-
se seems to emerge from a different culture to that of GATS,
with its emphasis on liberalisation and market-based instru-
ments.
The relative tension between environmental services and
GATS provisions can be shown for example by reference to the
GATS market access obligation (Article XVI). This obligation re-
quires the abolition and precludes the establishment of public
monopolies or exclusive service suppliers unless a WTO mem-
ber has scheduled a specific limitation to its commitment (Ar-
ticle XVI:2 (a) GATS). Monopolies and exclusive service sup-
pliers are, however, regulatory instruments which are typically
used in the context of environmental services. Article XVI of
GATS only applies if a WTO Member has made a commitment
in the respective sector. However, given the impact of further
negotiations, it is clear that the ultimate goal of the GATS regi-
me is full commitment in all sectors.
Furthermore, the national treatment obligation (Art. XVII
GATS), which requires that a WTO Member treats foreign ser-
vices and service suppliers no less favourably than like domes-
tic services and service suppliers, has impacts on the regulation
of environmental services. This is because it prohibits the mo-
dification of the conditions of competition in favour of domes-
tic services either formally or on a de facto basis.
Lastly the outcome of ongoing negotiations on disciplines
for domestic regulation according to Article VI:4 GATS are re-
levant. These negotiations take place in the Working Party on
Domestic Regulation, a subsidiary body of the Council for Tra-
de in Services. Such disciplines should ensure that domestic re-
gulations including licensing rules, technical standards, and
planning restrictions are no more burdensome, that is no more
trade restrictive, than necessary. Depending on the scope of fu-
ture disciplines and the specific design of a necessity test in such
disciplines, certain domestic regulations such as quality stan-
dards or universal service obligations could be seen as more bur-
densome than necessary. This may put them under pressure
from the multilateral trading system.
Areas of mutual support
The preceding discussion on the impact of the GATS on en-
vironmental services has revealed that the liberalisation of tra-
de in services on the one hand and public provision or strict re-
gulation on the other hand do not lead in the same directions
and are not necessarily mutually supportive. However, there can
also be areas of mutual support.
First, the GATS could enhance the effectiveness and efficien-
cy of provision of environmental services in relation to former
public monopolies, which have been recently transformed and
privatised. It is generally accepted that if a public monopoly is
privatised regulation needs to be in place to ensure competiti-
veness and an open market, because otherwise a private mono-
poly supplier will dominate the market and try to gain mono-
poly rents. Pro-competitive regulation is therefore necessary.
GATS commitments and GATS obligations could support such
regulation. However, it should also be kept in mind, that GATS
obligations are not a substitute for such regulation.
Another area of mutual supportiveness concerns private in-
vestment. If governments consider direct foreign investment in
environmental services as beneficial because they expect capi-
tal inflow or technology transfer, then GATS commitments
could support a stable investment climate. Even though GATS
commitments do not automatically attract investors and even
though a lack of GATS commitments does not always deter in-
vestors, there seems to be a general understanding that GATS
commitments can contribute positively to a decision to invest
in a foreign country.
In the end, the impact and effects of GATS on environmen-
tal services will depend on two factors: First, the regulatory fra-
mework and specific instruments employed by a country for the
provision of these services. Second, the scope and content of the
specific GATS commitments are made by a country. To ensure
that GATS does not put too much pressure on a particular regi-
me and that the flexibility of GATS can be used effectively to har-
ness the potential benefits of liberalisation, environmental plan-
ners and regulators, administrators and legislators need to
realise the impact of GATS on national regulation and need to
follow the ongoing GATS negotiations closely to prevent unne-
cessary or unwanted commitments in environmental services.
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